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Abstract. We present a novel Bayesian approach to semiotic dynamics, which is a
cognitive analogue of the naming game model restricted to two conventions. The one-shot
learning that characterizes the agent dynamics in the basic naming game is replaced by a
word-learning process, in which agents learn a new word by generalizing from the evidence
garnered through pairwise-interactions with other agents. The principle underlying the
model is that agents — like humans — can learn from a few positive examples and that
such a process is modeled in a Bayesian probabilistic framework. We show that the model
presents some analogies but also crucial differences with respect to the dynamics of the
basic two-convention naming game model. The model introduced aims at providing a
starting point for the construction of a general framework for studying the combined effects
of cognitive and social dynamics.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
A basic question in complexity theory is how the interactions between the units of the system lead to the emergence
of ordered states from initially disordered configurations [1, 2]. This general question concerns phenomena ranging
from phase transitions in condensed matter systems and self-organization in living matter to the appearance of norm
conventions and cultural paradigms in social systems. Various models were used in order to study social interactions
and cooperation, e.g. models of condensed matter systems (such as spin systems), statistical mechanical models (e.g.
based on the master equation), ecological competition models [1], many-agents game-theoretical models [3–5]. Opinion
dynamics and cultural spreading models represent suitable theoretical frameworks for a quantitative description of
the emergence of social consensus [2].
In this respect, the emergence of human language remains a challenging, multi-fold question, related in turn to
biological, ecological, social, logical, and cognitive aspects [6–10]. Language dynamics [11, 12] has provided models
describing phenomena of language competition and change that focus on the mutual interactions of linguistic traits
(sounds, phonemes, grammatical rules, or languages understood as fixed entities) under the influence of ecological
and social factors, modeling such interactions in analogy to biological competition and evolution.
However, the basic learning process of a word has a complex dynamics due to its cognitive dimension. In fact,
learning a word means to learn a concept (understood as a pointer to a subset of objects, see Refs. [10, 13, 14])
and a linguistic label —for example the name of the object— used for communicating the concept. The double
concept↔name nature of words has been studied through semiotic dynamics models, such as the models of Hurford
[15] and Nowak [16] (see also [17, 18]) and the naming game (NG) model [19, 20].
In the basic version of the model of Nowak [16], the language spoken by each agent i (i = 1, . . . , N) is defined
by two personal matrices, representing the links of a bipartite network joining Q names and R concepts: (1) an
active matrix U (i) representing the concept→name links, where the element U (i)q,r (q ∈ (1, Q), r ∈ (1, R)) gives
the probability that agent i will utter the qth name to communicate the rth concept; (2) the passive matrix H(i),
representing the name→ concept links, in which the element H(i)q,r represents the probability that an agent interprets
the qth name as referring to the rth concept. In the models of Hurford and in the model of Nowak, the languages
of each individual evolve with time according to a game-theoretical dynamics, with agents gaining a reproductive
advantage if their matrices have a higher communication efficiency. These studies have achieved interesting results,
such as the emergence of non-ambiguous one-to-one links between objects and sounds, and explain why homonyms
are more frequent than synonyms [15–18].
In the NG model [19, 20] there is only one concept (R = 1) that can be linked to a set of Q > 1 different names.
The model can be reformulated through the agents’ lists Li of the name↔concept connections known to each agent
i. In the case of two-conventions models, where the conventions are the names A and B, the list of the ith agent can
be Li = ∅ (no connection), Li = (A) or (B) (one name is known), or Li = (A,B) (both name↔concept connections
are known).
Extending semiotic dynamics models is not trivial and already two-opinion variants of the NG model, taking into
account committed groups, show a remarkable phase diagram [21]; and trying to describe actual cognitive effects
requires entirely new features [22]. This paper presents a minimal model to study the interplay of the cognitive and
social dynamical dimensions, assuming for simplicity the two-conventions NG model as a semiotic framework [20, 23]
and making a cognitive generalization within the experimentally validated Bayesian framework of [10] (see also Refs.
[13, 14, 24–27]). In that framework, an individual can learn a concept from a small number of examples, a most
remarkable feature of human learning [10, 28, 29], to be contrasted with machine learning algorithms, which require
a large amount of examples for generalizing successfully [30–32].
The paper is organized as follows. The new model is introduced in Sec. II. In Sec. III, we present and discuss the
features of the semiotic dynamics emerging from the numerical simulations and quantitatively compare them with
those of the two-conventions NG model. Future directions in the study of the interplay of the cognitive and the social
dynamics are outlined in Sec. V.
II. A BAYESIAN LEARNING APPROACH TO THE NAMING GAME
A. The two-conventions naming game model
Before introducing the new model, we recall the basic 2-conventions NG model [33], in which there is a single
concept C, corresponding to an external object, and two possible names (synonyms) A and B for referring to C.
Thus, the possibility of homonymy is excluded [23]. Each agent i is equipped with the list Li of the names known to
the agent. We assume that at t = 0 each agent i knows either A or B and has therefore a list Li = (A) or Li = (B),
3respectively.
During a pair-wise interaction, an agent can act as a speaker, when conveying a word to another agent, or as a
hearer, when receiving a word from a speaker. One can think of an agent conveying a word as uttering a name, e.g.
A, while pointing at an external object, corresponding to concept C: thus, the hearer records not only the name A
but also the name↔concept association between A and C. At a later time t > 0, the list Li of the ith agent can
contain one or both names, i.e., Li = (A), (B), or (A,B).
The system evolves according to the following update rules [23]:
1. Two agents i and j, the speaker and the hearer, respectively, are randomly selected.
2. The speaker i randomly extracts a name (here either A or B) from the list Li and conveys it to the hearer j.
Depending on the state of agent j, the communication is usually described as:
(a) Success: the conveyed name is present also in the hearer’s list Lj , i.e. also agent j knows its meaning; then
the two agents erase the other name from their lists, if present.
(b) Failure: the conveyed name is not present in the hearer’s list Lj ; then agent j records and adds it to the
list Lj .
3. Time is increased of one step, t→ t+ 1, and the simulation is reiterated from the first point above.
An example of unsuccessful and one of successful communication are schematized in the left panel (A) of Fig. 1, see
Ref. [19] for more examples. Despite its simple structure, the basic NG model describes the emergence of consensus
about which name to use, which is reached for any (disordered) initial configuration [34].
FIG. 1. Comparison of the basic and Bayesian NG model.
Panel (A): basic 2-conventions NG model. In a communication failure (upper figure), the name conveyed, B in the example, is
not present in the list of the hearer, who adds it to the list. In a communication success (lower figure), the word B is already
present in the hearer’s list and both agents erase A from their lists.
Panel (B): Bayesian NG model; in order to convey an example “+” to the hearer in association with name A, the speaker must
have already generalized concept C in association with A, represented here by the label [A]. In a communication failure (upper
figure), the hearer computes the Bayes probability p and the result is a p < 1/2; then the only outcome is that the hearer
records the example (reinforcement). In the Bayesian NG, there are two ways, in which the communication can be successful.
The first way (lower figure) is when p ≥ 1/2: the hearer generalizes C in association with A and attaches the label [A] to the
inventory. The second way (not shown) is the the agreement process, analogous to that of the basic NG, when both agents had
already generalized concept C in association with name A and remove label [B] from the inventory [+ + + . . . ]B if present. See
text for further details.
B. Toward a Bayesian naming game model
From a cognitive perspective, a “communication failure” of the NG model can be understood as a learning process,
in which the hearer learns a new word. It is a “one-shot learning process”, because it takes place instantaneously
(in a single time step) and independently of the the agent’s history (i.e. of the previous knowledge of the agent).
4However, modeling an actual learning process should take into account the agents’ experience, based on the previous
observations (the data already acquired) as well as the uncertain/incomplete character naturally accompanying any
learning process.
Here, the one-shot learning is replaced by a process that can describe basic but realistic situations, such as the
prototypical “linguistic games” [35]. For example, consider a “lecture game”, in which a lecturer (speaker) utters
the name A of an object and shows a real example “+” of the object to a student (hearer), repeating this process a
few times. Then, the teacher can e.g. (a) show another example and ask the student to name the object; (b) utter
the same name and ask the student to show an example of that object; or (c) do both things (uttering the name
and showing the object) and ask the student whether the name↔object correspondence is correct. The student will
not be able to answer correctly if not after having received some examples, enabling the student to generalize the
concept C corresponding to the object in association to name A. To model these and similar learning processes, we
need a criterion enabling the hearer to assess the degree of equivalence between the new example and a the examples
recorded previously.
The starting point for the replacement of the one-shot learning is Bayes’ theorem. According to Bayes’ theorem,
the posterior probability p (h|X) that the generic hypothesis h is the true hypothesis, after observing a new evidence
X, reads [36, 37],
p (h|X) = p (X|h) p (h)
p (X)
. (1)
Here, the prior probability p (h) gives the probability of occurrence of the hypothesis h before observing the data
and p (X|h) gives the probability of observing X if h is given. Finally, p (X) gives the normalization constraint; in
the applications it can be evaluated as p (X) =
∑
h′ p (X|h′) p (h′), where {h′} ∈ H represents the set of hypotheses,
within the hypothesis space H.
The next step is to find a way to compute explicitly the posterior probability p (h|X), through a representation of
the concepts and their relative examples in a suitable hypothesis space H of the possible extensions of a given concept
C, constituted by the mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses h. Following the experimentally verified Bayesian
statistical framework of Refs. [10, 28], we adopt the paradigmatic representation of a concept as a geometrical shape.
For example, the concept of “healthy level” of an individual in terms of the levels of cholesterol x and insulin y,
defined by the ranges xa ≤ x ≤ xb and ya ≤ y ≤ yb, where xi and yi (i = a, b) are suitable values, represents a
rectangle in the Euclidean x-y plane R2. Examples of healthy levels of specific individuals 1, 2, . . . correspond to
points (x1, y1), (x2, y2), · · · ∈ R2. In the following, we assume that a hypothesis h is represented by a rectangular
region in R2. Figure 2 shows four positive examples, denoted by the symbol “+”, associated to four different points
of the plane, consistent with (i.e. contained in) three different hypotheses, shown as rectangles.
FIG. 2. Three different hypotheses represented as axis-parallel rectangles in R2 and four positive examples “+” that are all
consistent with the three hypotheses. The set of all the rectangles that can be drawn in the plane constitutes the hypothesis
space H.
The problem of learning a word is now recast into an equivalent problem, consisting in acquiring the ability to
5infer whether a new example z recorded, corresponding to a new point “+” in R2, corresponds to the concept C,
after having seen a small set of positive examples “+” of C. More precisely, let X = {(x1, y1) , . . . , (xn, yn)} be a
sequence of n examples of the true concept C, already observed by the hearer, and z = (z1, z2) the new example. The
learner does not know the true concept C, i.e. the exact shape of the rectangle associated to C, but can compute
the generalization function p (z ∈ C|X) by integrating the predictions of all hypotheses h, weighted by their posterior
probabilities p (h|X):
p (z ∈ C|X) =
∫
h∈H
p (z ∈ C|h) p (h|X) dh . (2)
Clearly, p (z ∈ C|X) = 1 if z ∈ h and 0 otherwise. By means of the Bayes’ theorem (1), one can obtain the
right Bayesian probability for the problem at hand. A successful generalization is then defined quantitatively by
introducing a threshold p∗, representing an acceptance probability: an agent will generalize if the Bayesian probability
p (z ∈ C|X) ≥ p∗. The value p∗ = 1/2 is assumed, as in Ref. [28].
We assume that an Erlang prior characterizes the agents’ background knowledge. For a rectangle in R2 defined
by the tuple (l1, l2, s1, s2), where l1, l2 are the Cartesian coordinates of its lower-left corner and si its sides along
dimension i = 1, 2, the Erlang prior density is [10, 28]
pE = s1s2 exp
{
−
(
s1
σ1
+
s2
σ2
)}
, (3)
where the parameters σi represent the actual sizes of the concept, i.e. they are the sides of the concept rectangle
C along dimension i. The choice of a specific informative prior, such as the Erlang prior, is well motivated by the
fact that in the real world individuals have always some prior knowledge or expectation. In fact, a Bayesian learning
framework with an Erlang prior of the form (3) well describes experimental observations of learning processes of
human beings [28]. The final expression used below for computing the Bayesian probability p that, given the set of
previous examples X, the new example z falls in the same category of concept C, reads [28]
p (z ∈ C|X) ≈
exp
{
−
(
d˜1
σ1
+ d˜2σ2
)}
[(
1 + d˜1r1
)(
1 + d˜2r2
)]n−2 . (4)
Here ri (i = 1, 2) is an estimate of the extension of the set of examples along direction i, given by the maximum mutual
distance along dimension i between the examples of X; d˜i measures an effective distance between the new example
z and the previously recorded examples, i.e., d˜i = 0 if zi falls inside the value range of the examples of X along
dimension i, otherwise d˜i is the distance between z and the nearest example in X along the dimension i. Equation (4)
is actually a “quick-and-dirty” approximation that is reasonably good, except for n ≤ 3 and ri ≤ σ/10, estimating the
actual generalization function within a 10% error, see Refs. [10, 28] for details. Despite these approximations, Eq. (4)
will ensure that our computational model, described in the next section, retains the main features of the Bayesian
learning framework. It is to be noticed that for the validity of the Bayesian framework, it is crucial that the examples
are drawn randomly from the concept (strong sampling assumption), i.e. they are extracted from a probability density
that is uniform in the rectangle corresponding to the true concept [28]. This definition of generalization is now applied
below to word-learning.
C. The Bayesian word-learning model
Based on the Bayesian learning framework discussed above, in this section we introduce a minimal Bayesian
individual-based model of word-learning. For the sake of clarity, in analogy with the basic NG model, we study
the emergence of consensus in the simple situation, in which two names A and B can be used for referring to the
same concept C in pair-wise interactions among N agents.
At variance with the NG model, here in each basic pair-wise interaction an agent i, acting as a speaker, conveys
an example “+” of concept C, in association with either name A or B, to another agent j, who acts as hearer
(i, j = 1, . . . , N). In order to be able to communicate concept C uttering a name, e.g. name A, the speaker i must
have already generalized concept C in association with name A. This is signalled by the presence of name A in the list
Li. On the other hand, the hearer j always records the example received in the respective inventory, in the example
the inventory [+ + + . . . ]A.
The state of a generic agent i at time t is defined by
6• the list Li, to which a name is added whenever agent i generalizes concept C in association with that name;
agent i can use any name in Li to communicate C;
• two inventories [+ + + . . . ]A and [+ + + . . . ]B , containing the examples “+” of concept C received from the
other agents in association with name A and B, respectively.
It is assumed that initially each agent knows one word: a fraction nA(0) of the agents know concept C in association
with name A and the remaining fraction nB(0) = 1 − nA(0) in association with name B — no agent knows both
words, nAB(0) = 0. We will examine three different initial conditions:
symmetric initial conditions (SIC): nA(0) = nB(0) = 0.5
asymmetric initial conditions (AIC): nA(0) = 0.3, nB(0) = 0.7
reversed case of AIC (AICr): nA(0) = 0.7, nB(0) = 0.3
Initially, each agent i, within the fraction nA(0) of agents that know name A, is assigned nex,A = 4 examples “+” of
concept C in association with name A, but no examples in association with the other name B, so that agent i has
an A-inventory [+ + ++]A and an empty B-inventory [·]B . The complementary situation holds for the other agents
that know only name B, who initially receive nex,B = 4 examples of concept C in association with name B but none
in association with A. This choice, somehow arbitrary, is dictated by the condition that Eq. (4) becomes a good
approximation for n > 3 [10].
Examples are points uniformly generated inside the fixed rectangle corresponding to the true concept C, here
assumed to be a rectangle with lower left corner coordinates (0, 0) and sizes σ1 = 3 and σ2 = 1 along the x and y
axis, respectively. Results are independent of the assumed numerical values; in particular, no appreciable variation in
the convergence times tconv is observed as the rectangle area is varied, which is consistent with the strong sampling
assumption, on which the Bayesian learning framework rests; see Ref. [10] and Sec. III.
Furthermore, we introduce an element of asymmetry between the names A and B, related to the word-learning
process: different minimum numbers of examples n∗ex,A = 5 and n
∗
ex,B = 6 will be used, which are needed by agents
to generalize concept C in association with A and B, respectively. This is equivalent to assume that concept C is
slightly easier to learn in association with name A than B. Such an asymmetry plays a relevant role in the model
dynamics in differentiating the Bayesian generalization functions pA and pB from each other, see Sec. IV.
The dynamics of the model can be summarized by the following update rules:
1. A pair of agents i and j, acting as speaker and hearer, respectively, are randomly chosen among the agents.
2. The speaker selects randomly: (a) a name from the list Li (or selects the name present if Li contains a single
name), for example A (analogous steps follow if the word B is selected); (b) an example z among those contained
in the corresponding inventory [+ + + . . . ]A — ;
then the speaker i conveys the example extracted z in association with (e.g. uttering) the name selected A to
the hearer j.
3. The hearer adds the new example z (in association with A) to the inventory [+ + + . . . ]A. This reinforcement
process of the hearer’s knowledge always takes place.
4. Instead, the next step depends on the state of the hearer:
(a) Generalization. If the selected name, A in the example, is not present in the hearer’s list Lj , then the
hearer j computes the relative Bayesian probability pA = p(z ∈ C|XA) that the new example z falls in
the same category of concept C, using the examples previously recorded in association with A, i.e. from
the set of examples XA ∈ [+ + + . . . ]A. If pA ≥ 1/2, the hearer has managed to generalize concept C and
connects the inventory [+++ . . . ]A to name A; this is done by adding name A to the list Lj . Starting from
this moment, agent j can communicate concept C to other agents by conveying an example taken from the
inventory [+ + + . . . ]A while uttering the name A. If pA < 1/2, the hearer has not managed to generalize
the concept and nothing more happens (the reinforcement of the previous point is the only event taking
place).
(b) Agreement. The name uttered by the speaker, A in the example, is present in the hearer’s list Lj , meaning
that that agent j has already generalized concept C in association with name A and has connected the
corresponding inventory [+ + + . . . ]A to A. In this case, the hearer and the speaker proceed to make an
agreement — analogous to that of the NG model, leaving A in their lists Li and Lj and removing B is
present. No examples contained in any inventory are removed.
7TABLE I. Pair-wise interactions in the Bayesian NG model. The speaker (S) conveys a name
A−→ or B−→ to the hearer (H)
together with an example taken from the speaker’s inventory, [+ + + . . . ]A or [+ + + . . . ]B , respectively — this happens with
a branching probability q = 0.5 if the speaker has the list (A,B) and knows the meaning of both names. The outcome can
be: (1) a reinforcement (only); (2) generalization of concept C, if the Bayes probability is p > 1/2; (3) an agreement between
hearer and speaker, if both agents know the meaning of the conveyed name. Even if not indicated, reinforcement takes place
also in cases (2) and (3).
S-List Name H-List Branching Process Condition S- List H-List
(before) conveyed (before) probability (after) (after)
(A)
A−→ (A) (q = 1) Reinforcement always (A) (A)
(A)
A−→ (B) (q = 1) Reinforcement pA < 1/2 (A) (B)
(q = 1) Learning pA ≥ 1/2 (A) (A,B)
(A)
A−→ (A,B) (q = 1) Agreement always (A) (A)
(B)
B−→ (A) (q = 1) Reinforcement pB < 1/2 (B) (A)
(q = 1) Learning pB ≥ 1/2 (B) (A,B)
(B)
B−→ (B) (q = 1) Reinforcement always (B) (B)
(B)
B−→ (A,B) (q = 1) Agreement always (B) (B)
(A,B)
A−→ (A) q = 1/2 Agreement always (A) (A)
(A,B)
B−→ (A) q = 1/2 Reinforcement pB < 1/2 (A,B) (A)
Learning pB ≥ 1/2 (A,B) (A,B)
(A,B)
A−→ (B) q = 1/2 Reinforcement pA < 1/2 (A,B) (B)
Learning pA ≥ 1/2 (A,B) (A,B)
(A,B)
B−→ (B) q = 1/2 Agreement always (B) (B)
(A,B)
A−→ (A,B) q = 1/2 Agreement always (A) (A)
(A,B)
B−→ (A,B) q = 1/2 Agreement always (B) (B)
5. Time is updated, t→ t+ 1, and the simulation is reiterated from the first point above.
Two examples of Bayesian word-learning process, a successful and an unsuccessful one, are illustrated in the cartoon
in the right panel (B) of Fig. 1. Table I lists the possible encounter situations, together with the corresponding relevant
probabilities.
Notice that an agent i can enter a pair-wise interaction with a non-empty inventory of examples, e.g. [+ + + . . . ]A,
associated to name A, without being able to use name A to convey examples to other agents, i.e., without the name
A in the list Li due to not having generalized concept C in association with A. Those examples can have different
origins: (1) in the initial conditions, when nex,A randomly extracted examples associated to A and nex,B to B are
assigned to each agent; (2) in previous interactions, in which the examples were conveyed by other agents; (3) in an
agreement about convention B, which removed label A from the list Li while leaving all the corresponding examples in
the inventory associated to name A. In the latter case, the inventory [+++ . . . ]A may be “ready” for a generalization
process, since it contains a sufficient number of examples, i.e., agent i will probably be able to generalize as soon as
another example is conveyed by an agent. This situation is not as peculiar as it may look at first sight. In fact, there
is a linguistic analogue in the case where a speaker that loses the habit to use a certain word (or a language) A can
regain it promptly, if exposed to A again.
Notice also that without the agreement dynamics scheme introduced in the model, borrowed from the basic NG
model, the population fraction nAB of individuals who know both A and B (nA + nB + nAB = 1) would be growing,
until eventually nAB = 1.
III. RESULTS
In this section we study numerically the Bayesian NG model introduced above and discuss its main features. We
limit ourselves to study the model dynamics on a fully-connected network.
8In the new learning scheme, which replaces the one-shot learning of the two-conventions NG model, an individual
generalizes concept C on a suitable time scale ∆t > 1, rather than during a single interaction. However, a few
examples are sufficient for an agent to generalize concept C, as in a realistic concept-learning process. This is visible
from the Bayesian probabilities pA and pB computed by agents in the role of hearer, according to Eq. (4), once at
least n∗ex,A = 5 and n
∗
ex,B = 6 examples “+”, respectively, have been stored in the inventory associated to the name A
and B: Figure 3 shows the histograms of the pA’s and pB ’s computed from the initial time until consensus for a single
run with N = 2000 agents and starting with SIC. The low frequencies at small values of pA and pB and the highest
frequencies at values close to unity are due to the fact that the Bayesian probabilities reach values pA ≈ pB ≈ 1 very
fast, after a few learning attempts, consistently with the size principle, on which the Bayesian learning paradigm, and
in turn Eq. (4), are based [10].
FIG. 3. Histograms of the Bayesian probabilities pA, pB computed by agents during their learning attempts during a single run
(for N = 2000 agents, starting with SIC; n∗ex,A = 5, n
∗
ex,B = 6).
In order to visualize how the system approaches consensus, it is useful to consider some global observables, such
as the fractions nA(t), nB(t), and nAB(t) of agents that have generalized concept C in association with name A
only, name B only, or both names A and B, respectively, or the success rate S(t). The dynamics of a population of
N = 1000 agents (panels (A) and (B)) using different initial conditions, SIC, AIC, and AICr, and that of a population
of N = 100 agents starting with SIC (panels (C) and (D)) are shown in Fig. 4.
Panel (A) of Fig. 4 shows only the population fractions corresponding to the name found at consensus, for the
sake of clarity (the remaining population fractions eventually go to zero). For asymmetrical initial condition (AIC or
AICr), it is the initial majority that determines the convention found at consensus (that is B for AIC and A for AICr).
If the system starts from SIC, the convention A, for which agents can generalize earlier (n∗ex,A = 5 < n
∗
ex,B = 6), is
always found at consensus — in this case it is the asymmetry in the thresholds n∗ex,A and n
∗
ex,B , characterizing the
Bayesian learning process, to determine consensus.
Panel (B) of Fig. 4 shows the success rate S(t = tk), representing the average over different runs of the instantaneous
success rate Sk of the kth interaction at time tk, defined as follows: Sk = 1 in case of agreement between the two
agents or when a successful learning of the hearer takes places, following a Bayes probability p > 1/2; or Sk = 0 in
case of unsuccessful generalization, when p < 1/2 and only reinforcement takes place. The success rate S(t) varies
between S(0) ≈ (nA(0))2 + (nB(0))2, due to the respective fractions of agents that initially know the two conventions
A and B, to S ≈ 1 at consensus, following a typical S-shaped curve of learning processes [38]. In the case of SIC, the
initial value is S(0) ≈ 0.52 + 0.52 = 0.5, while for AIC or AICr the initial value is S(0) ≈ (0.3)2 + (0.7)2 ≈ 0.58.
We now investigate how the modified Bayesian dynamics affects the convergence times to consensus. The study of
the size-dependence of the convergence to consensus shows that there is a critical value N∗ ≈ 500 in the case of SIC,
such that for N ≤ N∗ there is a non-negligible probability that the final absorbing state is B. Panels (C) and (D) of
Fig. 4, representing the results for a system starting with SIC and a smaller size N = 100, show the existence of two
possible final absorbing states and that there are different times scales associated to the convergence to consensus:
name A is found at consensus in about 90% of cases and name B in the remaining cases. The branching probability
into A or B consensus is further investigated in panel (A) of Fig. 5, where we plot the branching probabilities pe,A, pe,B
versus the system sizes N . The nonlinear behavior (symmetrical sigmoid) signals the presence of finite-size effects,
particularly clear for relatively small N -values. In fact, when the fluctuations in the system are larger, the system
9FIG. 4. Average population fraction associated to the name shared in the final consensus state (upper panels (A) and (C))
and success rate S(t) (lower panels (B) and (D)) versus time. Left panels (A) and (B): system with N = 1000 agents starting
from different initial conditions, SIC, AIC, and AICr; averages done over 600 runs. Right panels (C) and (D): system with
N = 100 agents starting from SIC; averages done over 1000 runs — notice that due to the smaller size N = 100, the system
can converges to consensus both with name A (in a fraction of cases pe,A ≈ 0.9) and with name B (pe,B ≈ 0.1).
FIG. 5. Panel (A): probabilities pe,A and pe,B that the system reaches the consensus at A and B respectively, versus the system
sizes N , obtained by averaging over 1000 runs of a system starting with SIC. Panel (B): average number of examples n¯ex,A
and n¯ex,B recorded by an agent at consensus, for a system of N = 50, 100, 500, 1000, 1500, 2000 agents, starting with SIC, AIC,
AICr. Averages are done over 600 runs.
size can play an important role in the dynamics of social systems, as an actual thermodynamic limit is only allowed
for simulations of macroscopic physical systems [39].
The convergence time tconv follows a simple scaling rule with the system size N , related to the average number
of examples n¯ex,A, n¯ex,B relative to A,B respectively, stored in the agents’ inventories at consensus. These values
depend on the number of learning and reinforcement processes, and hence are related to the system size N . The
average number of interactions undergone by the agents until the system reaches the consensus is given by the sum
n¯int = n¯ex,A + n¯ex,B [40]. One expects that
tconv ≈ n¯intN , (5)
which suggests a linear scaling law (tconv ∼ N) for convergence time with the system size N for all the possible
initial conditions. A linear behavior is indeed confirmed by the numerical simulations with population sizes N =
10
50, 100, 500, 1000, 1500, 2000 starting from SIC, AIC, AICr. The relative numerical results are reported in Table II.
Moreover, in Eq. (5) the size-dependence of n¯int is ignored as it shows a weak dependence upon N , see panel (B) in
Fig. 5.
TABLE II. Scaling laws tconv ∼ Nα with the system size N . Here the parameters are n∗ex,A = 5, n∗ex,B = 6 with initial
conditions SIC, AIC and AICr. The average number of examples, n¯ex,A, n¯ex,B , stored at tconv, are obtained averaging over 600
runs of a system with N = 1000 agents.
α n¯ex,A n¯ex,B outcome
SIC 1.06 20 8 A,B
AIC 1.08 3 19 B
AICr 1.09 18 3 A
From the above mentioned scaling law, it is clear that the average number of examples stored by the agents at
consensus plays an important role in the semiotic dynamics. In particular, it is found that if the final absorbing
state is A (or B), then n¯ex,A > n¯ex,B ( n¯ex,B > n¯ex,A). Moreover, the average number of examples, relative to the
absorbing state, always increases monotonically with the system size while a size-independent behavior is observed in
the opposite case, see the right panel (B) of Fig. 5.
Finally, we compare the convergence time of the Bayesian word-learning model, tconv, with that of two-conventions
NG model, t¯conv [33], by studying the corresponding ratio R = tconv/t¯conv for common initial conditions and popula-
tion sizes. When starting with SIC, the values of the convergence times obtained from the two models become of the
same order by increasing N : R decreases with N , reaching unity for N = 10000, see Fig. 6. In other words, the time
scales of the two models become equivalent for relatively large system sizes, i.e., the learning processes of the two
models perform equivalently and the Bayesian approach roughly gives rise to the one-shot learning that characterizes
the two-conventions NG model. In the next section we discuss how the Bayesian model becomes asymptotically
equivalent to the minimal NG model. The inset of Fig. 6 represents R versus N , for N < 2000, given different
starting configurations, with SIC, AIC and AICr, and different population sizes. In the following, we focus on the
case of SIC.
FIG. 6. The ratio of the convergence times of the Bayesian word-learning model and the 2-conventions NG model, R =
tconv/t¯conv, versus the system size N , for a system starting with SIC. The inset illustrates the dependence of R on different
initial conditions. The curves are obtained averaging over 900 runs.
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FIG. 7. Model scheme with two non-excluding options. Arrows indicate allowed transitions between the “bilingual” state (A,B)
and the “monolingual” states A and B. Direct A↔ B transitions are not allowed.
IV. STABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section we investigate the stability properties of the mean-field dynamics of the Bayesian NG model, in
which statistical fluctuations and correlations are neglected. In the Bayesian NG model, as in the basic NG, agents
can use two non-excluding options A and B to refer to the same concept C. The main difference between the Bayesian
model and the basic NG model is in the learning process: a one-shot learning process in the basic NG and a Bayesian
process in the Bayesian NG model. In the latter case the presence of a name in the word list indicates that the agent
has generalized the corresponding concept from a set of positive recorded examples.
The NG model belongs to the wide class of models with two non-excluding options A and B, such as many models
of bilingualism [41], in which transitions between state (A) and state (B) are allowed only through an intermediate
(“bilingual”) state (A,B), as schematized in Fig. 7. The mean-field equations for the fractions nA(t) and nB(t) can
be obtained considering the gain and loss contributions of the transitions depicted in Fig. 7,
n˙A = pAB→A nAB − pA→AB nA ,
n˙B = pAB→B nAB − pB→AB nB . (6)
Here n˙a(t) = dna(t)/dt and the quantities pa→b represent the respective transition rates per individual, corresponding
to the arrows in Fig. 7 (a, b = A,B,AB). The equation for nAB(t) was omitted, since it is determined by the condition
that the total number of agents is constant, nA(t) + nB(t) + nAB(t) = 1.
The details of the possible pair-wise interactions in the Bayesian naming game are listed in Table I. From the various
contributions, one obtains the master equation
n˙A = −pBnAnB + n2AB +
3− pB
2
nAnAB ,
n˙B = −pAnAnB + n2AB +
3− pA
2
nBnAB , (7)
which can be rewritten in the form (6) with transition rates per individual given by
pA→AB = pBnB +
1
2
pBnAB , pB→AB = pAnA +
1
2
pAnAB , (8)
pAB→A =
3
2
nA + nAB , pAB→B =
3
2
nB + nAB . (9)
Equations (8) provide the transition rates of learning processes, while Eqs. (9) give the transition rates of agreement
processes. Setting x ≡ nA, y ≡ nB , and z = nAB ≡ 1− x− y, the autonomous system (7) becomes
x˙ = fx (x, y) ≡ −pBxy + (1− x− y)2 + 1
2
(3− pB)x(1− x− y) , (10)
y˙ = fy (x, y) ≡ −pAxy + (1− x− y)2 + 1
2
(3− pA)y(1− x− y) , (11)
where v = (fx(x, y), fy(x, y)) is the velocity field in the phase plane. For the following analysis, it is convenient to
write the Bayesian probabilities pA and pB appearing in these equations as time-dependent parameters of the model,
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FIG. 8. Results from two single simulations of a system with N = 100 agents, starting from SIC at (x0, y0) = (0.5, 0.5) and
reaching two different consensus states about name A or B. Panels (A) and (B) show the population fractions x(t) = nA(t)
and y(t) = nB(t). Panels (C) and (D) show the corresponding average number of examples recorded by an agent, n¯ex,A(t) and
n¯ex,B(t).
but they are actually highly non-linear functions of the variables. In fact, they can be thought as averages of the
microscopic Bayesian probability in Eq. (4) over the possible dynamical realizations. For this reason, they have also
a complex non-local time-dependence on the previous history of the interactions between agents. For the moment,
we assume pA(t) = pB(t) = p(t), returning later to the general case.
From the conditions defining the critical points, fx (x, y) = fy (x, y) = 0, one obtains (x− y) z = 0. Setting
z = 0, one obtains two solutions that correspond to consensus in A or B, given by (x1, y1, z1) = (1, 0, 0) and
(x2, y2, z2) = (0, 1, 0). Instead, setting (x− y) = 0 leads to the equation
2x2 − (p+ 5)x+ 2 = 0 , (12)
that has the solutions
x± =
p+ 5±√(p+ 5)2 − 16
4
. (13)
For p ∈ (0, 1], the corresponding solutions (x±, x±, 1− 2x±) are not suitable solutions, because z± = 1− 2x± < 0.
This analysis is valid for p > 0. In fact, p = p(t) is a function of time and for a finite interval of time after the initial
time one has that p = 0, which defines a different dynamical system. In the initial conditions used, z(0) = 0, which
implies z(t) = 0, x(t) = x(0), and y(t) = y(0) at any later time t as long as p(t) = 0, since x˙(t) = y˙(t) = z˙(t) = 0 (see
Eq. (7); in fact, the whole line x + y = 1 (for 0 < x, y < 1) represents a continuous set of equilibrium points. The
reason why in this model p(0) = 0 at t = 0 and also during a subsequent finite interval of time is twofold. First, agents
do not have any examples associated to the name not known and they have to receive at least n∗ex,A or n
∗
ex,B examples,
before being able to compute the corresponding Bayesian probability pA(t) or pB(t) — thus it is to be expected that
p(t) = 0 meanwhile. Furthermore, even when agents can compute the Bayesian probabilities, the effective probability
to generalize is actually zero, due to the threshold p∗ = 0.5 for a generalization to take place. The existence of the
(temporary) equilibrium points on the line x + y = 1 ends as soon as the parameter p(t) > p∗ and, according to
Eqs. (7), the two A- and B-consensus states become the only stable equilibrium points. The representative point in
the x-y-plane is deemed to leave the initial conditions on the z = 1− x− y = 0 line, due to the stochastic nature of
the dynamics, which is not invariant under time reversal [42].
To determine the nature of the critical points (x1, y1) = (1, 0) and (x2, y2) = (0, 1), one needs to evaluate at the
equilibrium points the 2 × 2 Jacobian matrix A(x, y) = {∂ifj}, where i, j = x, y. It is easy to show that both the
critical points (0, 1) and (1, 0) are asymptotically stable [43].
As long as the general case pA 6= pB , it can be shown that the trajectory of the system can point toward and
eventually reach the consensus state with A or B, depending on whether pA (t
∗) > pB (t∗) or pA (t∗) < pB (t∗), where
t∗ > 0 is the critical time at which the representative point leaves the initial position.
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FIG. 9. Population fractions nA(t), nB(t), and nAB(t), versus time, starting from SIC; results are obtained by averaging over
600 runs. Left column (panels (A) and (B)): a system with N = 100 agents can reach consensus with name A (panel(A), about
91% of runs) or name B (panel (B), about 9% of runs). Right column (panels (C) and (D)): system with N = 200 agents,
reaching consensus with name A in about 96% of runs (panel (C))) and with name B in about in the remainder 4% of runs
(panel (D)).
The convention A or B is selected randomly, depending on various factors related to the specific realization of the
system evolution, such as the numbers of examples n¯ex,A(t) and n¯ex,B(t) recorded by the agents until time t, their
quality from the point of view of the generalization, and the initial asymmetry of the thresholds for generalizing,
n∗ex,A 6= n∗ex,B . The asymmetrical thresholds n∗ex,A = 4 < n∗ex,B = 5 produce a bias toward consensus in A and
play a crucial role in the subsequent Bayesian semiotic dynamics; in fact, swapping the threshold values (setting
n∗ex,A = 5 > n
∗
ex,B = 4), the approach to consensus occurs with the outcomes A, B swapped.
We observed that for N & N∗ ≈ 500, the chances that the system converges to (B) become negligible. This can
be seen in panels (C) and (D) of Fig. 8, showing n¯ex,A(t) and n¯ex,B(t) versus time (averaged over the agents of the
system) for single runs, a population of N = 100 agents, and SIC, for different runs that relax toward consensus A
and B, respectively. After an initial transient, in which n¯ex,A(t) ≈ n¯ex,B(t), they differ more and more from each
other at times t > t∗. In turn, also pA and pB begin to differ significantly from each other, thus affecting the rate of
depletion of the populations during the subsequent dynamics. For instance, if pA > pB , then pB→AB > pA→AB , see
Eqs. (8), which means that the depletion of nB occurs faster then that of nA. In turn, this favours the decay of the
mixed states (A,B) into the state (A), see Eqs. (9), being nA > nB .
The asymmetry discussed above also affects the convergence times tAconv and t
B
conv and we find t
B
conv > t
A
conv in all
the numerical simulations. Despite the noise, such a trend is already appreciable in a single run, as shown in panels
(A) and (B) of Fig. 8. The mean fractions nA(t), nB(t), and nAB(t) versus time, obtained by averaging over many
runs, result in less noisy outputs and provide a more clear picture of the difference, which is visible in Fig. 9, obtained
using 600 runs starting with SIC and for N = 100 agents (panels (A) and (B)) and N = 200 agents (panels (C) and
(D)). In addition, the convergence times depend on the system size, increasing with the number of agents N : compare
the left panels (A) and (B), where N = 100 agents, with the right panels (C) and (D), where N = 200 agents.
The possibility that the same system, starting with the same initial conditions and evolving with the same dynamical
parameters, can reach either A or B is a consequence of the stochastic nature of dynamics. This does not happen for
N & N∗, when both n¯ex,A and n¯ex,B reach some threshold values close to those observed at tconv, which is clearly a
value sufficient for the agents to generalizing concept C. In fact, the scaling law of tconv with N shows that the sum
of n¯ex,A with n¯ex,B becomes nearly constant for N & N∗, implying that the dynamics is uniquely determined, that
is, the consensus always occurs at A from SIC, once the agents have stored a threshold number of n¯ex,A, n¯ex,B . It is
found that these threshold values correspond to n¯∗ex,A = 21, n¯
∗
ex,B = 12. Note that in n¯
∗
ex,A, n¯
∗
ex,B we add values the
four initial given examples stored in the agents’ inventories at the beginning. The reason is that the generalization
function p(t) outputs will effectively depend on them all. Therefore, at these threshold values, it would be very
unlikely that pB > pA, and so it would be the same for the consensus at B.
Now we consider the Bayesian probabilities pA(t) and pB(t) computed by agents and the corresponding number
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FIG. 10. Average values p¯A(t) and p¯B(t) computed using a (temporal) bin ∆t = 16× 103, versus time from for a single run of
a system reaching consensus at A. The convergence time is tconv ≈ 160× 103 and the population size is N = 5000. The inset
shows the average number of learning attempts noA, noB versus time for the same single run.
of learning attempts noA(t) and noB(t) made by agents at time t to learn concept C in association with word A
or B, respectively, i.e. the number of times that the agents compute pA or pB (only the case of a system starting
with SIC is considered). We consider a single run of a system with N = 5000 agents and study the average values
p¯A(t), p¯B(t), obtained by averaging pA(t) and pB(t) over the agents of the system. We also assume a coarse-grained
view, consisting in an additional average of p¯A(t), p¯B(t), and noA, noB , over a a temporal bin ∆t = 16× 103, in order
to reduce random fluctuations. Figure 10 shows the time evolution of the average probabilities p¯A(t) and p¯B(t) in the
time-range where data allow a good statistics. The probabilities grow monotonically and eventually reach the value
one. While this points at an equivalence between the mean-field regime of the Bayesian naming game and that of
the two-conventions NG model, in which agents learn at the first attempt (one-shoot learning), such an equivalence
is suggested but not fully reproduced by the coarse-grained analysis. The time evolution of the number of learning
attempts noA(t) and noB(t) shows that they are negligible both at the beginning and at the end of the dynamics —
see inset in Fig. 10. This is due to the fact that at the beginning it is most likely that either interactions between
agents with the same conventions take place (starting with SIC, each agent has a probability of 50% to interact with
an agent having the same convention) or interactions between agents with different conventions but with still too small
inventories to be able to generalize concept C, leading to reinforcement processes only. When approaching consensus,
agents with one of the conventions constitute the large majority of the population and thus they are again most likely
to interact through reinforcements only. Thus, the largest numbers of attempt to learn concept C in association with
A and B are expected to occur at the intermediate stage of the dynamics. In fact, noA(t) and noB(t) are observed to
reach a maximum at t ≈ tconv/2 for any given system size N , as visible in the inset of Fig. 10. Notice that also the
fraction of agents nAB , who know both conventions and can communicate using both name A and name B, possibly
allowing other agents to generalize in association with name A or B, reaches its maximum roughly at the same time.
V. CONCLUSION
We introduced a novel agent-based model that describes the appearance of linguistic consensus through a word-
learning process. The work presented is exploratory in nature, concerning the minimal problem of a single concept
that can be associated to two different possible names A or B, but is aimed at providing a prototype of general
framework for describing the interaction between the social and the cognitive dimension. To this aim, the model
is constructed on the basis of the semiotic dynamics of the NG model and is then extended by adding a Bayesian
cognitive process, mimicking human learning processes.
The model describes in a natural way (1) the uncertainty accompanying the first phase of a learning process, (2) the
gradual reduction of the uncertainty as more and more examples are provided, and (3) the ability to learn from a few
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examples. The semiotic dynamics of the synonyms is different from the basic NG, in that it depends on parameters
that are of a strictly cognitive nature, such as the thresholds n∗ex of the number of examples necessary before an
agent can try to generalize and the acceptance threshold p∗ for carrying out the generalization of a concept. The
interplay between the asymmetry of the conventions A and B, the system size, and the stochastic character of the
time evolution, have dramatic consequences on the consensus dynamics: there is a critical time t∗ > 0, when the
system begins to move in the phase-plane to eventually converge toward a consensus state; there is a critical system
size N∗, such that for N < N∗ the system can end up in any of the two consensus states and the convergence times
depends on N ; there is an asymmetry in the branching probabilities that the system converges toward one of the two
possible conventions and of the corresponding convergence times; the scaling laws of the convergence times versus N
differ from those observed in the basic NG model, because they depend on the learning experience of the agents.
The cognitive dimension offers additional possibilities for modelling in terms of specific cognitive parameters prob-
lems that are out of the reach of traditional social dynamics models. The model illustrated in this work represents a
step toward a generalized Bayesian approach to social interactions, leading to cultural conventions.
Future work can address specific problems of current interest from the point of view of cognitive processes; or
features relevant from the general standpoint of complexity theory. In the first case, it is possible to study in the
cognitive dimension the semiotic dynamics of homonyms, synonyms, and innovation, e.g., the cognitive conditions
leading to a name A1, associated to a concept C1, splitting into two names A1 and A2, associated to two related but
distinct concepts C1 and C2, as more examples become available that make the two concepts eventually distinguishable
from each other — a type of problems that cannot be tackled within models of cultural competition. In the second
case, one can mention the classical problem of the interplay between a central information source (bias) and the local
influences of individuals — this time in a cognitive framework.
Another question to be investigated within a cognitive framework would be the role of heterogeneity. In fact,
heterogeneity is known to characterize most of the known complex systems at various levels — here the diversity could
affect the dynamical parameters of e.g. the different competing names as well as those of the agents. Heterogeneity
of individuals can lead to counter-intuitive effects, such as resonant behaviors [44, 45]. Furthermore, the complex,
heterogeneous nature of a local underlying social network can change drastically the co-evolution and the time-scales
of the conventions in competition with each other [46].
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